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Abstract
In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards V1, ..., Vn and
must decide, for each reward Vi, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and
reveal the next value Vi. The gambler’s goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that
the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings
where the gambler can choose k items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in
a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gambler to know the distribution from which
the rewards V1, ..., Vn are drawn.
The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which V1, ..., Vn are drawn is very
strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples
from this distribution. We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of
interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically, even with full knowledge of the
distribution. Specifically, we provide a novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose
any k elements whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition, we
provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the related secretary problem
to single-sample prophet inequalities, and apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a
constant-sample prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings.
In addition, we apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional auction
mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric bidders. Connections between prophet
inequalities and posted-price mechanisms are already known, but applying the existing framework re-
quires knowledge of the underlying distributions, as well as the so-called “virtual values” even when the
underlying prophet inequalities do not. We therefore provide an extension of this framework that by-
passes virtual values altogether, allowing our mechanisms to take full advantage of the limited information
required by our new prophet inequalities.
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1 Introduction
Prophet inequalities are a fundamental tool in optimal stopping theory. In the classical prophet inequality,
a gambler observes a sequence V1, ..., Vn of n rewards sampled independently from known distributions
D1, . . . ,Dn. After seeing the ith reward, the gambler has two options: he can stop the game and keep reward
Vi, or he can continue the game. If he chooses to continue the game, he forfeits reward Vi forever, and is
shown the next reward Vi+1. The gambler’s goal is to obtain an expected reward that is competitive with
the best offline algorithm, represented by a prophet who can observe the values of all the variables V1, ..., Vn
before making her selection. A seminal result of Krengel, Sucheston and Garling [21, 22] states that there
is a strategy for the gambler so that his expected reward is at least half of the prophet’s expected reward.
Recently there has been a renewed interest in prophet inequalities, generalizing the problem to settings
where the prophet and gambler can choose any k out of the n presented items [1, 5], and more generally to
settings where the prophet and gambler can choose any independent set in a matroid or matroid intersection
environment [19]. However, all existing results require the gambler to know D1, . . . ,Dn.
We improve on the existing literature by giving the first prophet inequalities with limited information.
More concretely, we show how the gambler can obtain a constant factor of the prophet’s expected reward, even
when he only knows a single sample from each Di.1 This approach is robust, and guarantees—in expectation
over the observed sample sample and the realized state of the world—a simultaneous approximation to the
prophet’s reward for all possible distributions D. Our work is inspired by recent literature on mechanism
design [10, 15] and on ad auctions [8, 9] which explores how to obtain approximately optimal revenue
with limited information about an existing distribution of bidders’ values. Our work applies this limited
information framework beyond auctions. Indeed, while our work has applications in online and multi-
dimensional mechanism design, it also applies to the setting of optimal stopping problems.
1.1 Our results
In the list below, we summarize our new prophet inequalities. We remark that, for all the results below,
the weights of the items we are choosing online are revealed in an adversarial order (where the adversary
observes the values in advance before deciding how to order the elements) and where the online algorithm
has no knowledge of the distribution D from which the values are drawn except for a single sample. The
only exception is our result for constant degree bipartite matching environments, where the online algorithm
requires a constant number samples from the distribution D.
• k-Uniform Matroids. A 1 − O( 1√
k
)-competitive single-sample prophet inequality for k-uniform
matroids. This competitive ratio is asymptotically optimal as a function of k.
• Transversal Matroids. A 116 -competitive single-sample prophet inequality.
• Graphic Matroids. A 18 -competitive single-sample prophet inequality.
• Laminar Matroids. A 1
12
√
3
-competitive single-sample prophet inequality.
• Constant Degree Bipartite Matchings. A 16.75 -competitive constant-sample prophet inequality.
1.2 New Results in Mechanism Design
Myerson’s seminal paper [23] shows how to construct the revenue-optimal single-item auction when each
buyer’s valuation is drawn independently from a known distribution. Starting with work by Hartline and
Roughgarden [15] and by Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan [10], some recent attention has been focused
on designing auctions that guarantee a constant-factor approximation to Myerson’s optimal auction, even
when the seller has limited information about these distributions. However, prior to this work, progress on
this front has been mostly limited to single-dimensional settings.
1As described below, one of our results requires a constant number of samples.
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We apply our new prophet inequalities to construct the first truthful and approximately optimal auctions
for certain multi-dimensional settings that use limited information. It is worth noting that we cannot simply
plug our new prophet inequalities into the existing machinery of Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan [5] to
obtain these results, as their machinery requires full knowledge of the distributions, as well as the ability
to compute “virtual values.2” Our main contribution on this front is an extension of their framework that
allows us to analyze the expected virtual surplus of our mechanisms without ever learning the virtual values.
It is also worth noting that our results apply whenever the buyers’ valuations are drawn either from
identical regular distributions, or from distinct distributions satisfying the monotone hazard rate (MHR)
condition. In contrast, all existing multi-dimensional mechanisms with limited information work only when
bidders have identical distributions [7, 24]. More concretely, our results will apply to the following settings:
• Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms (SPMs) In this setting, a seller offers a service to buyers
who arrive online, in an order chosen by the seller. Each buyer i has a value vi for receiving service, and
is offered a take-it-or-leave-it price pi. The seller may face constraints on which buyers can be served
simultaneously, such as matroid constraints (that is, a set S of buyers can be simultaneously allocated
service if and only if S is an independent set in a matroid). We show a new approximately optimal
single-sample SPM for all matroid settings. This improves over previously known SPMs, which applied
to k-uniform settings and required bidder distributions to be identical [26].
• Order-Oblivious Posted Price Mechanisms (OPMs) for multi-dimensional environments
Order-Oblivious Posted Price mechanisms are approximately optimal SPMs, whose revenue guarantee
holds regardless of the order in which bidders arrive (that is, the seller may no longer choose the
order in which bidders arrive), and are known to imply truthful mechanisms for corresponding multi-
dimensional settings when they exist [5, 19]. We construct single-sample OPMs for all environments
for which we construct single-sample prophet inequalities, including graphic, laminar, transversal and
partition matroids, as well as (constant-sample OPMs for) constant-degree bipartite matching settings.
To the best of our knowledge, our mechanisms are the first OPMs that do not require full knowledge
of the distribution or the ability to compute virtual values.
• Multi-Dimensional Matching environments. In these environments, there are n buyers and m
goods, and no buyer can be allocated more than one good, or good be allocated to more than one
buyer. This induces a bipartite graph between buyers and goods, with an edge (i, j) present if vij > 0.
When this graph has maximum degree d (no buyer has value for more than d goods, and no good is
valued by more than d buyers), we give a mechanism that uses d2 + 1 samples. We note this is the first
limited-sample mechanism for matchings when bidders are asymmetric. In the case of i.i.d. regular
distributions, Roughgarden, Talgam-Cohen and Yan [24] and Devanur, Hartline, Karlin and Nguyen
[7] give limited-information mechanisms for general matching settings.
1.3 Our techniques
We derive our limited-information prophet inequalities using three different techniques.
1. Reduction from existing secretary problems. In section 3, we give a black-box reduction that
obtains single-sample prophet inequalities from existing order-oblivious3 algorithms for the secretary
problem.4 This allows us to obtain prophet inequalities for transversal, graphic and laminar matroids
based on corresponding secretary algorithms given by Dimitrov and Plaxton [11], Korula and Pal [20]
2Virtual values were introduced in Myerson’s seminal paper and are known to have strong connections to revenue maximiza-
tion. The virtual value of a bidder with value v sampled from distribution Di with CDF F and PDF f is v − 1−F (v)f(v) .
3We define what order-oblivious algorithms are in section 3.
4In the secretary problem, the value of weights can be arbitrary, but the elements are revealed in a random order. In the
prophet inequality problem, the value of weights come from distributions, but the order in which items are presented can be
arbitrary.
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and Jaillet, Zoto and Zenklusen [17]. However, not all algorithms for the secretary problem are order-
oblivious. In particular, Kleinberg’s algorithm for k-uniform matroids [18] is not order-oblivious, and
neither is Korula and Pal’s algorithm for matchings [20].
2. Sufficient thresholds with limited samples. In section 5, we give a constant-sample prophet
inequality for constant-degree bipartite matching settings. A prophet would accept element i only if it
were above a certain threshold, determined by the values of all other items. Since the elements arrive
one by one, we cannot compute these thresholds, and with a constant number of samples, we cannot
even estimate them accurately. Instead, we use our samples to set sufficient thresholds that do not
necessarily bear any relation to the prophet’s thresholds.
3. Analysis of correlated random walks The best known secretary algorithms [18] and full-information
prophet inequalities [1] for k-uniform matroids both guarantee a 1−O( 1√
k
) competitive ratio. In order
to asymptotically match this competitive ratio, we give a new algorithm in section 4, whose analysis
models the drawing of “samples” or “values” as positive and negative steps in a random walk. This
random walk is correlated because for every “sample” si that we observe (which makes the walk move
upward), there is a corresponding “value” vi which will make the walk move “downward”. By esti-
mating the expected height of this correlated random walk, we are able to guarantee that each of the
top k values (that is, the values that are accepted by the optimal offline algorithm) are selected by our
online algorithm with probability 1−O( 1√
k
).
There are many settings (arbitrary matroids, the intersection of any k arbitrary matroids) for which
full-information prophet inequalities exist but limited-information prophet inequalities don’t. We hope that
these techniques can help develop such new limited-information algorithms for these settings in the future.
2 Preliminaries
Environments and Offline Selection Problems An environment I = (U ,J ) is given by a universe of
elements U = {1, ..., n} and a collection J ⊂ 2U of feasible subsets of U . An algorithm A for the offline
selection problem on I takes as input a vector of positive weights v = (v1, ..., vn) for elements of U and
outputs the independent set MAX(v) = argmaxS∈J
∑
i∈S vi with the maximum weight. We denote by
OPT (v) =
∑
i∈MAX(v) vi the weight of this maximum independent set.
Online Selection Problems Given an environment I = (U ,J ), an algorithm A for the online selection
problem takes as online input a vector of values v = (v1, ..., vn) in some order (vi1 , ..., vin) (this order will
be specified below). The algorithm must maintain a set A of accepted elements, and element ij ∈ U must
be either accepted when its value vij is revealed, or rejected forever before moving on to the next item ij+1.
At all times, the set A of accepted items must be an independent set (that is, A ∈ J ). For convenience of
notation, we define A∗(v) = A(vi1 , ..., vin) to be the final set of items accepted by A, and note that A∗(v)
depends on the order in which the items vi1 , ..., vin are revealed.
Prophet Inequalities Given an environment I with universe set U = {1, ..., n}, let D = D1 × ...×Dn be
a product distribution over Rn≥0.5 Let v = (v1, ..., vn) be drawn from D. We say that an algorithm A for the
online selection problem induces a prophet inequality with competitive ratio α for environment I if
Ev←D[
∑
i∈A∗(v)
vi] ≥ α · Ev←D[OPT (v)]
5We remark that the assumption that the rewards V1, ..., Vn are independent is somewhat necessary if we want a constant
competitive ratio. Hill and Kertz [16] show that if we allow arbitrary correlation between the rewards, then the gambler cannot
obtain more than a 1
n
fraction of the gambler’s expected reward.
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where the expectations are taken with respect to the random choice of v and the random coin tosses of A.
The above inequality holds regardless of the order in which the elements vi1 , ..., vin are revealed. We remark
that this is a stronger property than that guaranteed by the prophet inequalities in previous papers [19],
where the adversary had to choose which element ij to reveal at time j using only knowledge of the items
and values (i1, vi1), ..., (ij−1, vij−1) revealed up to time j − 1.
Limited-Information Prophet Inequalities In order to guarantee a prophet inequality with a constant
competitive ratio, the online algorithm A must have some information about the distributions D1, ...,Dn
from which the values are drawn. We say that A is a constant-sample prophet inequality if it has access only
to a constant number of samples s1 = (s11, ..., s
1
n), ..., s
d = (sd1, ..., s
d
n), each drawn from the joint distribution
D. When A is constant-sample, its expected reward Ev,s1,...,sd [
∑
i∈A∗(s1,...,sd;v) vi] is computed over the
randomness in the vector of values v, the random samples s1, ..., sd and the random coin tosses of the
algorithm. We remark that, except for our results for matching environments, all our limited-information
prophet inequalities use only one sample s = (s1, ..., sn) from the joint distribution D.
Our Constraints. We can give different feasibility constraints by placing different structure on J . We
consider constraints that are matroids, specific types of matroids, or bipartite matchings. We refer the reader
who is not familiar with these constraints to Appendix A for a formal definition of each setting we consider.
Secretary Problems The secretary problem for an environment (U ,J ) [4] is an online selection problem
where the item values v1, ..., vn can be adversarially chosen, and they are revealed to the online algorithm in a
random order. This is incomparable in terms of hardness with the prophet inequality setting described above,
where the values are random variables, and they are presented in an adversarial order. We remark that there
exist competitive algorithms for the secretary problem when J is a uniform matroid [18], a laminar matroid
[17], graphic matroid [20], a transversal matroid [11], or a bipartite matching [20]. If the online algorithm
can choose the order in which the weights are revealed, then there exists a competitive algorithm for general
matroids [17]. If the weight for item i is not completely adversarial, but is instead chosen randomly without
replacement from a list (w1, ..., wn), then there also exists a competitive algorithm for matroids [25], even
when the order in which the items is revealed is adversarially chosen [14].
3 Prophet Inequalities from Secretary Algorithms
In this section, we provide a formal black-box method to convert specific kinds of solutions to the secretary
problem to single-sample prophet inequalities. More formally, our reduction will work for order-oblivious
algorithms, which we define as follows.
Definition 1. We say that an algorithm S for the secretary problem (together with its corresponding analysis)
is order-oblivious if, on a randomly ordered input vector (vi1 , ..., vin):
1. (algorithm) S sets a (possibly random) number k, observes without accepting the first k values S =
{vi1 , ..., vik}, and uses information from S to choose elements from V = {vik+1 , ..., vin}.
2. (analysis) S maintains its competitive ratio even if the elements from V are revealed in any (possibly
adversarial) order. In other words, the analysis does not fully exploit the randomness in the arrival
of elements, it just requires that the elements from S arrive before the elements of V , and that the
elements of S are the first k items in a random permutation of values.
We argue in appendix C that existing algorithms for graphic, transversal and laminar matroids are
order-oblivious. Furthermore, Oveis Gharan and Vondrak [14]’s matroid secretary algorithm for the random
assignment model is also order-oblivious (a fact that they claim in their paper). Combined with Theorem 1
below, this gives us single-sample prophet inequalities for graphic, transversal and laminar matroids, as well
as arbitrary matroids when each Di is identical. This is stated formally in Corollary 1.
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We now show how to construct an algorithm P for the limited-information prophet problem given an
order-oblivious algorithm S for the secretary problem. Recall that the algorithm P takes as offline input
a vector s = (s1, ..., sn) of samples drawn from a distribution D, and takes as online input a vector v also
drawn from D, and whose individual components are provided in an adversarial order.
PS(s1, ..., sn; vi1 , ..., vin)
Offline Stage
1. Let k be the number of elements that S observes before it starts accepting elements (i.e.,
k = |S|).
2. Let sj1 , ..., sjn be a random permutation of s = (s1, ..., sn). Pass sj1 , ..., sjk as the first k
inputs to S.
Online Stage
3. For each index i ∈ {i1, ..., in}:
a. If i ∈ {j1, ..., jk}, then index i has already been processed as a “sample”. Ignore it and
continue.
b. If i ∈ {jj+1, ..., jn}, then pass the value vi to algorithm S, and accept i if and only if S
accepts i.
Theorem 1. If S is an order-oblivious algorithm for the secretary problem with competitive ratio α, then
PS is a single-sample prophet inequality with competitive ratio α.
We give the proof for Theorem 1 in appendix C. The proof that PS inherits the competitive ratio of S
uses the fact that the joint distribution of values associated to the items in our simulation of S is exactly the
same as the true value distribution D. Note that our single-sample algorithm PS does not use any sampled
values for elements in the set V . This is important, as we can then reuse the samples for items in V for
other purposes, such as setting reserve prices in auctions, as we will see in Section 6.
Corollary 1.
1. For graphic matroids, there exists a 18 -competitive single-sample prophet inequality based on the secre-
tary algorithm of Korula and Pal [20]
2. For transversal matroids, there exists a 116 -competitive single-sample prophet inequality based on the
secretary algorithm of Dimitrov and Plaxton [11].
3. For laminar matroids, there exists a 1
12
√
3
-competitive single-sample prophet inequality based on the
secretary algorithm of Jaillet, Soto, and Zenklusen [17].
4. For general matroid settings, when weights are drawn from identical and independent distributions,
there exists a
1− 1e
20 -competitive single-sample prophet inequality based on the secretary algorithm of
Oveis Gharan and Vondrak for matroids in the random assignment model [14].6
4 Single-Sample Prophet Inequalities for k-Uniform Matroids
Recently, Alaei [1] gave a full-information prophet inequality that is
(
1− 1√
k+3
)
-competitive, which is
asymptotically optimal. This raises the question of whether there also exists a 1−O( 1√
k
) competitive single-
sample prophet inequality for k-uniform matroids. Since the corresponding algorithm (of Kleinberg, which
obtains a competitive ratio of 1−O( 1√
k
)) for the secretary problem is not order-oblivious, we cannot use our
6We note that a similar result for general matroids under i.i.d. distributions was already proved by two of the authors [19].
Their result did not emphasize the single-sample nature of the algorithm.
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reduction from the previous section. Instead, we develop a new algorithm, and show that we can guarantee
a 1−O( 1√
k
) competitive ratio by giving a new analysis for prophet inequalities based on correlated random
walks. We note also that our algorithm is comparatively simpler than previous algorithms.
4.1 The Rehearsal Algorithm
We now describe our algorithm, which we call the Rehearsal Algorithm. The algorithm needs to fill k slots,
and each slot i is associated with a threshold Ti (which is defined below). Each slot i can only be filled
by a value that is above the threshold Ti, and can only be filled once. Each observed value can only fill a
single slot. When we see an element that can fill at least one available slot, we fill the slot with the highest
threshold. When we see an element that cannot fill any available slots, we reject it.
Intuitively, one might try to set the ith threshold Ti to the i
th largest sample. This algorithm doesn’t
quite work, but a small modification suffices: instead, we set the first k − 2√k thresholds equal to the top
k− 2√k samples, then set the remaining 2√k thresholds equal to the k− 2√kth highest sample (essentially
repeating this sample 2
√
k times as a threshold). This is necessary in order for the probability of selecting
the highest-value items to be sufficiently close to 1. (See Lemmas 10 and 11 in appendix G.)
We describe the algorithm formally below.
Rehearsal(s1, ..., sn; vi1 , ..., vin)
1. Offline Phase
1.a Let s(1) > ... > s(n) be the observed samples in decreasing order.
1.b For j ∈ {1, ..., k − 2√k} set Tj = s(j).
1.c For k − 2√k < j ≤ k, set Tj = Tk−2√k = s(k−2
√
k).
2. Online Phase
Initialize S = {1, . . . , k} as the set of available slots. For j ∈ {1, ..., n}:
2.a Let vij be the value of the j
th revealed item. Let α be an index such that Tα−1 > vij > Tα.
2.b Let S ∩ {α, α+ 1, ..., k} be the set of slots that have not been filled, and that could be filled
by vij . Let m = minS ∩ {α, ..., k}. This is the first slot that could be occupied by vij .
2.c If S ∩ {α, ..., k} is empty, reject vij
2.d If S ∩ {α, ..., k} is not empty, accept vij and update S ← S −m.
In appendix G, we prove the following theorem. As we mentioned above, the proof may be interesting in
its own right for its use of correlated random walks to analyze prophet inequalities. Due to the complexity
of the proof, we defer it to the last appendix.
Theorem 2. Let I = (U ,J ) be a k-uniform matroid. The rehearsal algorithm is a single-sample prophet
inequality with a competitive ratio of 1−O( 1√
k
).
5 Bipartite Matching Environments
Before we give our algorithm, we establish some notation to make our exposition clearer.
Edge Indices Let G = (L ∪ R,E) be a degree-d bipartite graph, and let e = (`, r) be an edge in this
graph. There are at most d edges incident to `, and we can assign them an arbitrary order {0, 1, ..., d− 1}.
Analogously, we can assign the edges incident to r an order {0, 1..., d−1}. Without loss of generality, assume
that e is the jth edge incident to `, and the kth edge incident to r. Define Index(e) = 1 + j + d · k. This
index function has two key properties
1. Index(e) ∈ {1, ..., d2}
2. If e, e′ share a vertex, then Index(e) 6= Index(e′).
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Edge Thresholds Given an vector of values v = (v1, ..., v|E|) and an edge e ∈ E define xe(v) to be 1 if
e is in the maximum weight matching when the weights are given by v, and 0 if e is not in this maximum
weight matching.7 Note that xe is a deterministic increasing function of ve when all the other weights v−e
are fixed. Thus, there exists a threshold function that takes as input the weight v−e of all the other edges,
and outputs the lowest weight that edge e needs to have to be in the maximum weight matching.
Te(v−e) = inf{ve : xe(ve, v−e) = 1}.
Our algorithm. We construct an algorithm PMatching that takes as offline input a collection s1 =
(s11, ..., s
1
n), ..., s
d2 = (sd
2
1 , ..., s
d2
n ) of samples, and as online input a vector v of values (vi1 , ..., vin). It proceeds
as follows:
PMatching(s1, ..., sd2 ; vi1 , ..., vi|E|)
Offline Phase:
1 For each edge e, compute i = Index(e).
2 For each edge e, set its corresponding sample to be si. Set its price to be pe = Te(s
i
−e).
Online Phase:
3 Initialize a set A of accepted items to ∅.
4 For e ∈ {i1, ..., i|E|}:
4.a Flip a coin ce =
{
1 with probability 13
0 with probability 23
4.b If ce = 0, discard edge e and move on to the next edge.
4.c If ce = 1, accept edge e if and only if ve > pe and A ∪ {e} is a matching in the
bipartite graph G.
Theorem 3. The algorithm PMatching guarantees a 16.75 competitive ratio for environments I that are
degree-d bipartite matchings.
We present the proof of this theorem in appendix D. We remark that, for general bipartite matchings
(and, more generally, for intersections of two partition matroids), an analogous algorithm with n samples
obtains the same competitive ratio.
Even though our algorithm is not an auction, it is inspired by an approximately optimal auction for
bipartite matching environments given by Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan [5]. Their auction requires
knowledge of the distribution from which edge weights are drawn, and requires knowledge of the virtual
values associated with these distributions, which can be estimated in their paper with n4 log n samples. In
contrast, our algorithm only requires a constant number of samples and approximately maximizes the weight
of the matching (as opposed to its virtual weight).
6 Mechanism Design with Limited Information
In this section, we give new limited-information auctions for online and multi-dimensional mechanism design.
In particular, we improve over existing literature as follows
• Single-Dimensional SPMs with Non-Identical Distributions We give the first limited-information
sequential posted price mechanisms (SPMs) for matroids and constant-degree bipartite matching set-
tings. Our results guarantee a constant approximation to revenue when distributions are identical and
regular, or when distributions are distinct and MHR. The best previously known limited-information
SPM [26] applies only to k-uniform matroids and requires distributions to be i.i.d.
7We can set a tie-braking rule so the maximum weight matching is unique.
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• OPMs for Multidimensional Unit-Demand Mechanism Design We give the first limited-
information OPMs for partition, graphic, laminar, and transversal matroid settings, as well as constant-
degree bipartite matchings. For bipartite matchings, there exist limited-information auctions that
approximately maximize revenue when bidders have identical distributions [7] [24]. Our auction is
the first that is approximately optimal for bidders with distinct distributions satisfying the monotone
hazard rate condition.
• A new reduction from welfare to revenue maximization We give a new reduction from approx-
imate welfare maximization to approximate revenue maximization for single-dimensional environments
when buyers’ preferences are identical and regular. This reduction generalizes the well know fact that
the Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) auction with appropriate reserves is approximately optimal for ma-
troid environments [15, 10] to show that any mechanism that approximately maximizes welfare (not
necessarily VCG) also approximately maximizes revenue when valuations are regular and i.i.d.
Before stating our results more formally, we establish some preliminaries and recall prior work on mech-
anism design.
6.1 Mechanism Design Preliminaries
Due to space constraints, some details are deferred to the appendix. Contained in Appendix B is a formal
definition of a mechanism, posted-price mechanism, as well as the specific mechanism design problems we
solve (called Bayesian Single-Dimensional Mechanism Design (BSMD) and Bayesian Multi-Dimensional Unit-
Demand Mechanism Design (BMUMD) in [5]). Contained also is a brief list of facts related to mechanism
design (such as the connection between revenue and virtual valuations). We include here the relevant related
work necessary to understand our approach.
Mechanisms with Reserves The idea of combining simple, welfare-optimizing mechanisms with revenue-
optimizing reserve prices originated in [15]. In [15], the authors first remove every bidder who does not meet
their reserve, and then run the welfare maximizing mechanism. This process was later dubbed an “eager”
combination of mechanisms with reserves. The authors of [10] introduce a “lazy” combination of mechanisms
with reserves that first runs the mechanism, and then removes all bidders who do not meet their reserve.
In this work, we concern ourselves primarily with lazy reserves. When we refer to monopoly reserves, we
mean setting the reserve price φ−1i (0) for each bidder i. When we refer to sample reserves, we mean setting
a random reserve price ri ← Di for bidder i, that is drawn from the same distribution as Di.
A reduction from OPMs to multi-dimensional mechanism design Chawla, Hartline, Malec and
Sivan [5] show how to reduce designing (approximately) optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms to (ap-
proximately) solving a related single-dimensional problem in a specific way. Given an instance I of a
multi-dimensional mechanism design problem with n items and m buyers, they construct an analogous
single-dimensional instance Icopies with nm buyers. That is, each buyer i in the original setting gets split
into m buyers in Icopies. The (i, j)th buyer in Icopies only values the (i, j)th good, and her valuation vij is
drawn from the same distribution Dij as in the original setting. We use the following result from [5]:
Lemma 1. ([5]) Let I be an instance of the BMUMD, and let Icopies be its analogous single-dimensional
environment. If there exists an OPM for Icopies that achieves an α-approximation to the optimal revenue,
then there exists a truthful mechanism for I that achieves an α-approximation to the optimal revenue. 8
8Formally, they show that there exists a truthful mechanism for I that obtains an α-approximation to the optimal revenue
achievable by any deterministic mechanism. It is shown in [6] that the optimal revenue achievable by any (possibly randomized)
mechanism is at most five times larger than that of the optimal deterministic mechanism. So an OPM for Icopies that achieves an
α-approximation to the optimal revenue implies the existence of a truthful mechanism for I that achieves an α/5 approximation
to the optimal revenue of any (possibly randomized) mechanism.
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6.2 From Prophet Inequalities to Mechanisms
Let P(vi1 , ..., vin) be a limited-information prophet inequality with a competitive ratio of α. All of the
limited-information algorithms that we gave in the previous sections are monotonic in v, meaning that the
higher a value vi is, the higher the probability that our algorithms accept item i. This means that any of our
limited-information algorithms induces a limited-information online allocation rule x(v), and this allocation
rule is monotonic. When each value corresponds to a different bidder (single-dimensional setting), this
monotonic allocation rule implies a pricing rule p(v) which makes the mechanism (x, p) truthful. This means
that all our limited-information algorithms can be used to give truthful online mechanisms to maximize
welfare. Furthermore, our mechanisms are posted price mechanisms. This is because when we need to
decide whether to accept bidder i or not, the decision to accept depends only on the set A of already
accepted bidders and on the samples that we have from D. If P obtains a competitive ratio of α, we have
Ev[xi(v) · v] ≥ αEv[OPT (v)]. Thus, our prophet inequalities give sequential posted price mechanisms that
approximately maximize welfare in single-dimensional settings.
6.3 From Welfare to Revenue: The I.I.D. Case
At this point, we have proven prophet inequalities and turned them into posted-price mechanisms with
good welfare guarantees, but have said nothing about revenue. We show in this section how to guarantee
a good revenue approximation given a guarantee for a good approximation to welfare. We again note that
this process is novel and cannot be replaced by simply plugging our prophet inequalities into the machinery
of [5], which requires full knowledge of the distributions to apply, even if our prophet inequalities do not.
Comparison Based Mechanisms Our reduction from welfare to revenue when distributions are i.i.d.
requires the mechanism M to be comparison-based. We define below what it means for a mechanism to be
comparison based when it uses samples.
Definition 2. Let M(v; s1, ..., sd) be a mechanism for single-dimensional settings which depends on a vector
of bids v = (v1, ..., vn) ← D and also on a collection of samples s1 = (s11, ..., s1n), ..., sd = (sd1, ..., sdn), each
drawn from D. Let x be the allocation rule associated with M. We say that M is comparison-based if the
allocation rule x(v1, ...vn, s
1
1, ..., s
d
n) only depends on the relative order of its arguments, and not on their
respective values.
The rehearsal algorithm and the algorithms derived from our black-box reduction in corollary 1 are all
comparison-based. The only algorithm which is not comparison-based is our matching algorithm PMatching,
which uses an algorithm for computing maximum weight matchings as a black-box to set a threshold price
pe = inf{ve : e is in a maximum weight matching when all other weights are sIndex(e)−e }. Since pe cannot
necessarily be computed by comparisons between the samples in sIndex(e), PMatching is not comparison-
based. If we use the Greedy algorithm (which is comparison-based) instead of an optimal bipartite matching
algorithm, then PMatching becomes comparison-based but loses a factor of 2 in its competitive ratio.
Theorem 4. Let J be any downwards-closed set system, and let each Di be identical and regular. Let also
M be any single-dimensional comparison-based mechanism whose expected welfare competitive ratio is α.
Then the mechanism that combines (either eagerly or lazily) M with monopoly reserves has expected revenue
competitive ratio α.
Of course, computing the monopoly reserves requires knowledge of the distributions. These reserves can
be replaced by samples, using a result (stated in Appendix E) from Azar, Daskalakis, Micali and Weinberg [3].
Corollary 2. If M is a single-dimensional mechanism that guarantees an α approximation to welfare when
distributions are i.i.d. and regular then M combined with lazy sample reserves guarantees an α2 approximation
to revenue and an α2 approximation to welfare.
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6.4 From Welfare to Revenue: the MHR case
Since we want mechanisms that guarantee good revenue for asymmetric bidders, we also need a reduction from
welfare maximization to revenue maximization when distributions are not identical. It is well known (and
stated in Appendix E) that, when bidders’ distributions have a monotone hazard rate, a single-dimensional
mechanism that approximates welfare combined with lazy monopoly reserves gives a good approximation
to revenue [10]. We emphasize that an analogous result is not known for multi-dimensional settings.9.
Combining this with lemma 2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3. If M guarantees an α approximation to welfare and distributions are MHR then M combined
with lazy sample reserves guarantees an α2e approximation to revenue and an
α
2 approximation to welfare.
6.5 Our mechanisms
Since our limited-information prophet inequalities guarantee a good approximation to welfare, we are now
ready to give our approximately optimal multi-dimensional OPMs. Given an environment J for which we
have a limited-information online algorithm P, our online mechanism for J will behave as follows
1. Use P to choose a set W ∈ J of winners that approximately maximizes welfare.
2. Use a sample r ← D as a vector of lazy reserves. Keep only winners i ∈W that satisfy vi ≥ ri.
We note that for all the limited-information algorithms that we obtain from our black-box reduction in
section 3, we only uses the samples si corresponding to items i that are never chosen by our algorithms.
The samples si corresponding to items i that are chosen by the algorithm (that is, corresponding to auction
winners) are never used, and hence can be used to set reserve prices.
In Appendix E, we state two theorems for OPMs, one when distributions are i.i.d. and regular, and the
other one when distributions have a monotone hazard rate, but are not necessarily identical. We remark,
as described above, that to apply our algorithm PMatching in the i.i.d. regular setting, we need to modify
it so it uses the greedy matching algorithm as a black-box. Theorems 7 and 8 are direct applications of
Corollaries 2 and 3. Essentially, they state that we can obtain limited-information multi-dimensional for
in any unit-demand setting for which we have a limited-information prophet inequality. If we start with a
limited-information prophet inequality with competitive ratio α, then the corresponding mechanism for i.i.d.
regular environments has revenue and welfare competitive ratio α/2, and the corresponding mechanism for
non-i.i.d. MHR environments has revenue competitive ratio α/2e and welfare competitive ratio α/2. We
separately state below our theorems as they apply to bipartite matching, which models settings where goods
are matched to buyers.
Theorem 5. For the BMUMD problem on constant-degree bipartite matching settings, there exists a 113.5e -
competitive auction using a constant number of samples when buyers’ valuations are drawn from MHR
distributions. A modification of this algorithm gives a 127 -competitive limited-information auction when
buyers’ valuations are drawn from i.i.d. regular distributions.
Finally, even for settings where we do not have limited-information prophet inequalities, we can leverage
existing results to obtain improved mechanism design results. Jaillet, Soto and Zenklusen [17] give an
algorithm for the matroid secretary problem in the free order model, where the algorithm gets to choose the
order in which values are revealed. This model corresponds to a Sequential Posted Price Mechanism. We
give in appendix F an improved analysis of Jaillet, Soto and Zenklusen, improving their competitive ratio
from 19 to
1
4 . We use this improved analysis to give the following SPM.
Theorem 6. Let J be any matroid and let each Di be MHR. The there exists a truthful SPM requiring only
a single sample from D that guarantees a revenue competitive ratio of 18e and a welfare competitive ratio of
1
8 . When the distributions Di are independent and regular, this algorithm obtains a revenue competitive ratio
of 18 .
9If such a result existed, then the VCG auction together with appropriate reserves would be a very simple, approximately
optimal multidimensional mechanism when distributions are MHR.
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Appendix
A Matroids and Feasibility Constraints
• Matroids. J is a matroid if and only if J is downwards-closed10, contains ∅, and satisfies the
augmentation property: for all S, S′ ∈ J with |S| > |S′|, there exists some x ∈ S − S′ such that
S′ ∪ {x} ∈ J .
• Uniform matroids of rank k. A set S ⊂ U is in J if and only if |S| ≤ k.
• Partition matroids. Let B1, ..., B` be disjoint subsets of U such that U = B1 ∪ ... ∪ B`. Associate
a positive integer capacity ci with each block Bi. A set S ⊂ U is in J if and only if |S ∩ Bi| ≤ ci for
every i ∈ {1, ..., `}.
• Laminar matroids. Let F ∈ 2U be a laminar family of subsets of U . F is a laminar family iff for
all A,B ∈ F , we have A ⊆ B, B ⊆ A, or A ∩ B = ∅. Associate also, for every set A ∈ F , a positive
integer capacity cA. A set S ∈ J if and only if |S ∩A| ≤ cA for all A ∈ F .
• Graphic Matroids. Let G = (V,E) be a graph with vertex set V and edge set E. The universe U
of the set system is given by the set of edges E. A subset S ⊂ E is in J if and only if E induces no
cycles in the graph G. In other words, a subset of edges is feasible if and only if it is a forest.
• Transversal Matroids. Let G = (L ∪ R,E) be a bipartite graph, with left-vertex set L and right-
vertex set R. The universe U of the set system is L, and a subset S ⊂ L is in J if and only if there is
a matching in the graph G that matches every vertex of S to some vertex in R.
• Bipartite Matchings. Let G = (L ∪ R,E) be a bipartite graph and let U = E. A set S ⊂ E is
independent if and only if it induces a matching in G. The bipartite matching has degree d if at most
d edges are incident to any given vertex.
10J is downward-closed if for any S ∈ J and any T ⊂ S, we have T ∈ J .
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B Omitted Details From Section 6.1
Mechanisms An instance of the Bayesian Single-Dimensional Mechanism Design problem (BSMD) is
specified by a set system (U ,J ) and a product distribution D = D1 × ...Dn, where n = |U|. Each element
of U represents a buyer, interested in obtaining a service. The collection J ⊂ 2U represents constraints
on which buyers can receive service simultaneously. Each buyer i’s value for receiving service is a random
variable vi drawn from the distribution Di. A mechanism is said to be dominant strategy truthful if it is in
each bidder’s interest to report truthfully their value for each item, no matter what values are reported by
the other bidders.
Formally, a mechanism is a pair of vector-valued functions (x, p) where, given a vector of bids b =
(b1, ..., bn), xi(b) is player i’s probability of receiving service and pi(b) is player i’s expected payment. If
bidder i’s true preferences are given by vi, then her expected utility when the profile of reported bids
is b is U(vi, bi, b−i) = xi(b) · vi − pi(b). A mechanism is dominant strategy truthful if for all vi, bi, b−i,
we have U(vi, vi, b−i) ≥ U(vi, bi, b−i). We also require mechanisms to be individually rational. That is,
U(vi, vi, b−i) ≥ 0 for all vi, b−i.
Allocation Rules Determine Prices [23, 2] If M = (x, p) is a single-dimensional mechanism, then M
is truthful if and only if xi(bi, b−i) is a monotonically increasing function of bi (regardless of the vector of
other bids b−i) and the price function satisfies
pi(bi) = bixi(bi)−
∫ bi
0
xi(z)dz
where the dependence on b−i has been omitted. Thus, a monotonic allocation rule immediately specifies a
truthful mechanism for single-dimensional settings.
Monotone Hazard Rate The hazard rate function h(v) of a distribution with cumultive distribution
function F (v) and probability density function f(v) is defined as h(v) = f(v)1−F (v) . The distribution has a
monotone hazard rate (MHR) if h(v) is increasing in v.
Virtual Valuations and Revenue The virtual value of a bidder with value v sampled from a distribution
with CDF F and PDF f is usually denoted by φ(v), and is equal to v − 1−F (v)f(v) . The distribution is called
regular if φ(v) is monotonically increasing in v. It is immediate that all MHR distributions are regular.
Myerson’s famous theorem shows that in all single dimensional settings, the expected revenue of a truthful
mechanism is exactly its expected virtual welfare. That is Ev[
∑n
i=1 pi(v)] = Ev[
∑
i xi(v)φi(vi)].
Posted Price Mechanisms A single-dimensional sequential posted price mechanism (SPM) serves bidders
one at a time, offering each a price upon arrival that depends only on the previously observed bids and
the underlying distributions. The mechanism maintains a set S of bidders who have been assigned service,
initialized to be ∅, and adds each bidder to S iff their reported bid exceeds the price offered. An order-oblivious
posted price mechanism (OPM) is a sequential posted price mechanism that maintains its approximation
guarantee when the order is chosen by an adversary instead of the mechanism. 11
Bayesian Multi-parameter Unit-demand Mechanism Design (BMUMD) In a Bayesian multidi-
mensional mechanism design problem, there are n buyers interested in m items for sale. Each buyer i has
a value vij for receiving item j. Let U = [n] × [m], with the element (i, j) denoting the event that bidder
i receives item j. Further denote by J the subsets of U corresponding to feasible allocations. That is, a
set S ∈ J iff it is feasible to simultaneously allocate item j to bidder i for all (i, j) ∈ S. A setting is said
to be unit-demand if for all S ∈ J , (i, j) ∈ S ⇒ (i, j′) /∈ S for all j 6= j′ (i.e. it is infeasible to allocate
11We remark that our definition matches that of [19], which extends the one given in [5].
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any bidder more than one item). As in [5], we also assume that each vij is sampled independently from a
known distribution Dij . As in the single dimensional setting, we seek to devise a truthful mechanism whose
expected revenue is (approximately) optimal with respect to the maximum over all truthful mechanisms.
C Omitted Proofs and Algorithms from section 3
We now give a proof of theorem 1.
Theorem (Theorem 1). If S is an order-oblivious algorithm for the secretary problem with competitive ratio
α, then PS is a single-sample algorithm for the prophet problem with competitive ratio α.
Proof. The algorithm PS first permutes the vector s of samples into a random permutation sj1 , ..., sjn
and takes the first k elements sj1 , ..., sjk of this permutation and passes them as inputs to the secretary
algorithm S. After that, the secretary algorithm S is passed all the inputs vi where i 6∈ {j1, ..., jk} in an
arbitrary order. Since S is order-oblivious, the set it selects has a weight of at least α · OPT (v), where
OPT (v) = maxA∈J
∑
i∈A vi. So if we let f(v) denote the probability density function associated with the
joint distribution D, we have that our algorithm PS obtains expected reward of at least∫
v
f(v)α ·OPT (v)dv
The prophet’s expected reward is
OPT =
∫
v
f(v) ·OPT (v)dv
which immediately says that PS obtains competitive ratio α, completing the proof.
C.1 Existing order-oblivious secretary algorithms
We sketch some existing secretary algorithms in this subsection, and argue why they are order-oblivious.
Oveis Gharan and Vondrak [14]’s algorithm for general matroids in the random assignment
model. If the rank of the matroid given by J is less than 12, this algorithm runs the rank-1 matroid
algorithm. Otherwise it observes a set the first half of its input and sets a threshold T equal to the b r4c+ 1st
largest value it observes, where r is the. For the second half of the input, it accepts all items above the
threshold T , as long as accepting them does not violate the matroid constraints. It is immediate that this
algorithm is order-oblivious.
Dimitrov and Plaxton’s algorithm for transversal matroids [11]. A transversal matroid is given
by a graph G = (L ∪ R,E). The universe U is the set of left-vertices L. The algorithm begins by assigning
an ranking to the set R of right vertices. It then chooses a set S of “samples” consisting of the first
k = Binom(n, 12 ) values seen. All the values in S are discarded, but they are used to construct an auxiliary
matching M0(S), where each item in S is matched to the highest ranking right-node that is still available.
The algorithm then constructs the “real matching” M1 using elements from V = L − S. As each of the
remaining left-vertices ` ∈ L − S arrives, ` is matched with the highest ranked right vertex r that is not
matched in M0(S), as long as r is not already matched in M1. Dimitrov and Plaxton show that this is a
1
16
competitive algorithm, and that this competitive ratio holds regardless of the order in which elements from
V are revealed. Thus, the algorithm is order-oblivious.
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Rank-1 matroids Before giving the algorithms for graphic and laminar matroids, we first give a very
simple 14 -competitive algorithm for the classical secretary problem (choosing one out of n items) that is
order oblivious.
SRank−1(vi1 , ..., vin)
1 Let k = Binomial(n, 12 ).
2 Let T = max{vi1 , ..., vik}.
3 Accept the first element in vik+1 , ..., vin satisfying vi > T .
With probability 1/4, the highest element is somewhere in vik+1 , ..., vin and the second-highest is a
“sample” in vi1 , ..., vik . In this case, the highest element is accepted no matter what order the elements in
V are revealed. Thus SRank−1 is order-oblivious.
Korula and Pal’s algorithm for graphic matroids [20]. A graphic matroid is given by a graph
G = (V,E). The universe U is the set of edges and a set S ⊂ E is independent if it does not induce a cycle
in G. Korula and Pal start by giving an arbitrary ordering {1, ..., n} to the vertices in V . This induces two
directed graphs G0 = (V,E0), G1 = (V,E1) where an edge e = (i, j) ∈ E0 if and only if i < j in the assigned
ordering of V and either (i, j) or (j, i) are in E. Analogously, an edge e = (i, j) ∈ E1 if and only if j < i and
either (i, j) or (j, i) are in E. Note that both graphs G0, G1 are acyclic.
Korula and Pal’s algorithm first flips a coin c to choose a graph Gc, and then runs, for each vertex v ∈ V ,
the rank-1 secretary algorithm to choose a unique edge e leaving v in Gc. They show that this algorithm is
1
2e competitive by using Dynkin’s algorithm [12]. By replacing Dynkin’s algorithm with its order-oblivious
counterpart SRank−1, we can obtain a 18 competitive secretary algorithm for graphic matroids. This algorithm
is order-oblivious in a “partitioned sense”: it first randomly partitions the universe (set of edges) into blocks
B1, ..., B|V |, where block Bv consists of the edges leaving v in graph Gc. Then, it runs the order-oblivious
algorithm for rank-1 matroids on each block. It is not hard to see that our proof reducing order-oblivious
secretary algorithms to single-sample prophet inequalities also applies to this setting.
Jaillet, Soto and Zenklusen’s laminar matroid algorithm [17]. Like Korula and Pal’s algorithm,
the algorithm for laminar matroids also reduces to running the rank-1 matroid algorithm on a sequence
of disjoint blocks. Thus, it is also order-oblivious in a partitioned sense, and also implies a single-sample
prophet inequality.
D Omitted Proofs from Section 5
Theorem (Theorem 3). The algorithm PMatching guarantees a 16.75 competitive ratio for environments I
that are degree-d bipartite matchings.
Proof. Let v = (v1, ..., v|E|) be drawn from a joint distribution D1× ...×D|E|. Recall that Te(v−e) = inf{ve :
e is in the maximum weight matching, given all other weights are v−e}. Thus, the optimal offline algorithm
selects a matching that has an expected weight of
OPT =
|E|∑
e=1
Prv←D[ve ≥ Te(v−e)] · Ev←D[ve|ve ≥ Te(v−e)]
Let qe = Prv←D[ve ≥ Te(v−e)] and recall that pe = Te(sIndex(e)−e ). Since sIndex(e) is a sample drawn
from the same distribution that v is drawn, we have that Pr[ve ≥ pe] = qe. We also have E[ve|ve ≥ pe] =
Ev←D[ve|ve ≥ Te(v−e)]. So we can write the optimal reward as
OPT =
∑
e
Pr[ve ≥ pe]E[ve ≥ pe].
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What is the reward obtained by our algorithm PMatching? Recall that PMatching first sets a price pe for
each edge e. When the value ve is revealed, the algorithm flips a coin ce that is equal to one with probability
1
3 , and accepts e if and only if ce = 1 and ve ≥ pe and A ∪ {e} is an independent set (i.e. a matching in the
given bipartite graph). For each edge e ∈ E, define the following three random events
1. ce = 1,
2. ve ≥ pe,
3. A ∪ {e} is an independent set.
Call these events Xe, Ye and Ze, respectively.
Thus, the expected reward obtained by PMatching is
W =
∑
e
Pr[Xe and Ye and Ze] · E[ve|Xe, Ye, Ze]
Clearly, Xe is independent from Ye, Ze and ve. This means we can write
W =
∑
e
1
3
Pr[Ye and Ze] · E[ve|Ye, Ze].
However, Ye and Ze are not necessarily independent. Recall that Ze = “A ∪ {e} is an independent set”,
where A is the set of items accepted before e, and Ye = “ve ≥ p′′e . The price pe depends on a sample sIndex(e)
that may have been used to price an edge e′ arriving before e, and hence to influence the set A.
For any edge e = (`, r), we can define the following two events E1, E2, stating that no other edge e
′
incident to ` and no edge e′ incident to r get chosen by P
E1 = |{e′ = (`, r′) : e′ 6= e and ve′ ≥ pe′ and ce′ = 1}| = 0
E2 = |{e′ = (`′, r) : e′ 6= e and ve′ ≥ pe′ and ce′ = 1}| = 0
If both events E1 and E2 hold, then A ∪ {e} will always be an independent set. Recall that edge e’s
contribution to the PMatching’s expected reward is 13Pr[Ye and Ze] · E[ve|Ye and Ze]. Since Ze always holds
whenever both E1, E2 hold, we have
Pr[Ye and Ze] · E[ve|Ye and Ze] ≥ Pr[Ye and E1 and E2] · E[ve|Ye and E1 and E2].
Note that events E1, E2 only depend on values ve′ and prices pe′ for e
′ 6= e. Since D is a product distribution,
ve is independent of ve′ . Also, since e, e
′ share a vertex, we have that the prices pe, p′e are determined using
different samples sIndex(e), sIndex(e
′). Thus Ye is independent of E1 and of E2. This means that we can write
Pr[Ye and E1 and E2] · E[ve|Ye and E1 and E2] = Pr[E1 and E2] · Pr[Ye] · E[ve|Ye].
Thus, it suffices to give a a constant lower bound on Pr[E1 and E2] in order to guarantee a constant factor
competitive ratio for PMatching.
We now follow a line of argument from Chawla, Hartline, Malec and Sivan [5]. Since the edges in a
maximum matching form an independent set, and the probability of any edge e being present in a maximum
matching is Pr[ve ≥ pe] = Pr[Ye], we have ∑
e′:e′=(`,r′)
Pr[Ye′ ] ≤ 1
∑
e′:e′=(`′,r)
Pr[Ye′ ] ≤ 1.
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Now, the probability of PMatching choosing an element i is Pr[Xe and Ye and Ze] ≤ Pr[Xe] · Pr[Ye] =
1
3Pr[Ye], so we have ∑
e′:e′=(`,r′)
Pr[Xe and Ye and Ze] ≤ 1
3
∑
e′:e′=(`′,r)
Pr[Xe and Ye and Ze] ≤ 1
3
This means that the probability that event E1 does not happen is at most
1
3 , and analogously for event
E2. Thus, Pr[E1] ≥ 23 , P r[E2] ≥ 23 . Since events E1 is more likely to happen when event E2 happens, we
have
Pr[E1 and E2] ≥ Pr[E1] · Pr[E1|E2] ≥ 2
3
· 2
3
=
4
9
.
We can conclude that
W =
n∑
i=1
Pr[Xi and Yi and Zi] · E[vi|Xi, Yi, Zi]
=
n∑
i=1
1
3
Pr[Yi and Zi] · E[vi|Yi, Zi]
≥
n∑
i=1
1
3
Pr[Yi] · Pr[E1 and E2] · E[vi|Yi]
≥
n∑
i=1
1
6.75
Pr[Yi] · E[vi|Yi]
=
1
6.75
OPT
We remark that the only place where we needed d2 samples was to argue that any two incident edges
e, e′ have independent prices pe, p′e. For general bipartite matchings, if we have |E| samples s1, ..., s|E|, we
can use sample se to compute pe, and then all prices are independent. Thus, our algorithm can be used for
general matchings if we have access to |E| samples from D.
E Omitted Proofs from Section 6
Lemma 2. ([3]12) Let J be any downwards-closed set system and let each Di be regular (not necessarily
identical). Let M be a mechanism such that the lazy combination of M with monopoly reserves has an expected
revenue competitive ratio of α. Then the lazy combination of M with single sample reserves13 obtains an
expected revenue competitive ratio of α2 .
14 Furthermore, if M obtains expected welfare competitive ratio of
β, then the lazy combination of M with single sample reserves or median reserves obtains expected welfare
competitive ratio of β2 .
12This result was stated for VCG auctions, but it applies without modifying the proof to any auction that approximately
maximizes welfare. We note that Dhangwatnotai, Roughgarden and Yan proved this result for VCG auctions with sample
reserves. [10]. We also note that the result depends on the fact, proved in [10], that when there is only a single-buyer with
distribution D, the mechanism that offers a posted price equal to a sample from D obtains 1
2
of the optimal revenue.
13Sample each bidder’s reserve ri independently from Di
14We could also replace the median with the pth quantile and get a competitive ratio of α · min{p, 1 − p}. Any error in
approximating the median (or quantile) is directly absorbed into the competitive ratio as well.
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Proposition 1. ([10]) Let J be any downwards-closed set system, and let each Di be MHR. Let also M be
any single-dimensional universally truthful mechanism15 whose expected welfare competitive ratio is α. Then
the mechanism M′ that combines (lazily) M with monopoly reserves has a revenue competitive ratio of αe .
In order to prove Proposition 1, we need to borrow a lemma from Yan [26].
Lemma 3. ( [26]) Let D be an MHR distribution with Myerson reserve r∗. Let also V (t) denote the expected
welfare of the single bidder mechanism that sets price t, and R(t) denote the expected revenue of the single
bidder mechanism that sets price t (when the bidder’s value is drawn from D). Then:
R(max{t, r∗}) ≥ 1
e
V (t)
The proof of Proposition 1 parallels that of Theorem 4.9 from [26], but replaces VCG with an arbitrary
truthful mechanism. We again note that it is observed in [10] that their proof for VCG applies to any
approximation algorithm, but as their setting and claim is slightly different, we repeat it here for clarity.
Proof of Proposition 1: Observe first that if we prove the claim for deterministic mechanisms, then the claim
immediately follows for universally truthful mechanisms as well. So we can fix bidder i and v−i for the
remaining bids and look at the conditional expected revenue from bidder i in this case. For deterministic
mechanisms M, there is some threshold t such that bidder i wins the item if and only if his value is above t.
So the conditional contribution to the expected welfare of M is V (t), and the conditional contribution to the
expected revenue of the lazy combination of M with Myerson reserves is R(max{t, r∗i }). By Lemma 3, this is
at least 1eV (t). So in all cases, the conditional contribution to the expected revenue of the lazy combination
of M with Myerson reserves is at least a 1e fraction of the conditional contribution to the expected welfare of
M, and therefore the expected revenue of M combined lazily with Myerson reserves is at least a 1e fraction
of the expected welfare of M. As the optimal expected welfare upper bounds the optimal expected revenue,
this completes the proof. 
To prove Theorem 4 for the lazy combination with Myerson reserves, we need a technical lemma regarding
properties of comparison-based algorithms. Lemma 4 below says that in order for a comparison-based
mechanism to achieve good welfare, it must accept a good fraction of the highest bidders in expectation
(where “good fraction” means relative to the best possible).
Lemma 4. Let M be any comparison-based mechanism for feasibility constraints J whose expected welfare
competitive ratio is α. Fix an ordering of bidders x1, . . . , xn and relative ordering of values v1 > . . . > vn
(but not the values themselves). Let also J(i) = maxS∈J {|S ∩{1, . . . , i}|}, and qj denote the probability that
M selects xj. Then for all i, we have: ∑
j≤i
qj ≥ αJ(i)
Proof. Observe first that qj is well-defined: As M is a comparison-based mechanism, once we fix the bidders
and their relative ordering of values, the behavior of the mechanism is also fixed, independent of what the
actual values are. So assume for contradiction that the lemma is false, and let i be an index for which∑
j≤i qj < αJ(i). Then set vj = 1 for all j ≤ i and vk = 0 for all k > i. Then M obtains expected welfare∑
j≤i qj < αJ(i), and the optimal mechanism obtains expected welfare J(i). So M does not have expected
welfare competitive ratio α.
We now give the proof of theorem 4
Theorem (Theorem 4). Let J be any downwards-closed set system, and let each Di be identical and regular.
Let also M be any single-dimensional comparison-based mechanism whose expected welfare competitive ratio
is α. Then the mechanism that combines (either eagerly or lazily) M with monopoly reserves has expected
revenue competitive ratio α.
15A mechanism is universally truthful if it is a distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. All posted-price mecha-
nisms are universally truthful.
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Proof. We first recall Myerson’s lemma that expected revenue (for all truthful mechanisms) is exactly ex-
pected virtual welfare [23]. We now make the same observation as [5]: if we run a good welfare mechanism
on the virtual values instead of the values, then the welfare guarantee of the original mechanism immediately
gives us a virtual welfare (i.e. revenue) guarantee. As the original mechanism was truthful, its allocation
rule must have been monotone, and therefore whenever the virtual valuation function, φi, is monotone, the
resulting mechanism is also truthful. φi is monotone exactly when Di is regular.
So the mechanism we would like to implement is M on the virtual values (which we will denote by φ(M)),
but we want to implement φ(M) without knowing the virtual values. Because each Di is identical and
regular, whenever φ(M) wants to compare two virtual values, we can just compare the values instead. This
is because the comparison will yield the same result. So all that’s left is to handle negative virtual values.
We could just remove all negative virtual values first, and then run φ(M) on the remaining bidders. This
is exactly the same as removing all bidders who don’t meet their Myerson reserve first, and running M on the
remaining bidders by the observation in the previous paragraph. As M obtains expected welfare competitive
ratio α when all values are positive, we get that φ(M) obtains expected virtual welfare (revenue) competitive
ratio α when run only on bidders with positive virtual values. Therefore, the eager combination of M with
Myerson reserves gives a revenue competitive ratio of α.
We also could just run φ(M) first, and remove the negative virtual values after. However, it’s not obvious
that this mechanism succeeds, as we are no longer directly running φ(M) on bidders with positive virtual
value. Nevertheless, we can use Lemma 4 to argue that we still get good revenue with lazy removal of
negative virtual values. For any fixed bids, relabel the bidders so that v1 > . . . > vn. Let m denote the
largest index such that vm ≥ 0, and qj denote the probability that M selects bidder xj , and Qi =
∑i
j=1 qj .
Then we can write the expected virtual welfare of φ(M) with lazy removal of negative virtual values as:
m∑
j=1
qj · φ(vj) = Qm · φ(vm)+
m−1∑
i=1
Qi · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
We can also let pj = 1 if Myerson’s auction selects xj and 0 otherwise, and Pi =
∑i
j=1 pj . Then the
expected revenue of Myerson’s auction is just:
Pm · φ(vm) +
m−1∑
i=1
Pi · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
Again let J(i) denote the maximum size of a feasible set in J using only bidders in {x1, . . . , xi}. Then
we clearly have Pi ≤ J(i). By Lemma 4, we also have Qi ≥ α · J(i). Putting this together with the above
work we get:
Qm · φ(vm) +
m−1∑
i=1
Qi · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
≥ α · J(m) · φ(vm) +
m−1∑
i=1
α · J(i) · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
and
Pm · φ(vm) +
m−1∑
i=1
Pi · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
≤ J(m) · φ(vm) +
m−1∑
i=1
J(i) · (φ(vi)− φ(vi+1))
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which exactly says that the expected virtual welfare competitive ratio of φ(M) with lazy removal of
negative virtual values is α. Again, we observe that this is exactly the same mechanism as M combined
lazily with Myerson reserves and complete the proof of the Theorem.
Theorem 7. Let J be a downwards-closed set system and let each Di be identical and regular. Then there
exist truthful OPMs with the following guarantees:
1. When J is a k-uniform matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 12 − O( 1√k ) and a welfare
competitive ratio of 12 −O( 1√k ) using two samples from D.16
2. When J is a graphic matroid we have a revenue competitive ratio of 116 , and a welfare competitive
ratio of 116 using one sample from D.
3. When J is a transversal matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 132 and a welfare competitive
ratio of 132 using one sample from D.
4. When J is a laminar matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 1
24
√
3
and a welfare competitive
ratio of 1
24
√
3
using one sample from D.
5. When J is a general matroid , we have a revenue competitive ratio of 1− 1e40 and a welfare competitive
ratio of
1− 1e
40 using one sample from D.
6. When J is a degree d-bipartite matching, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 127 and a 127 welfare
competitive ratio using d2 + 1 samples from D.
Our results for MHR distributions are very similar, with the exception that for the MHR case, our
PMatching algorithm is the same one as the one described in section 5.
Theorem 8. Let J be a downwards-closed set system and let each Di be MHR (not necessarily identical).
Then there exist truthful OPMs with the following guarantees:
1. When J is a k-uniform matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 12e − O( 1√k ) and a welfare
competitive ratio of 12 −O( 1√k ) using two samples from D
2. When J is a graphic matroid we have a revenue competitive ratio of 116e , and a welfare competitive
ratio of 116 using one sample from D.
3. When J is a transversal matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 132e and a welfare competitive
ratio of 132 using one sample from D.
4. When J is a laminar matroid, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 1
24e
√
3
and a welfare competitive
ratio of 1
24
√
3
using one sample from D.
5. When J is a degree d-bipartite matching, we have a revenue competitive ratio of 113.5e and a 113.5 welfare
competitive ratio using d2 + 1 samples.
16Alternatively, instead of using the rehearsal algorithm, we can use a simpler single-sample algorithm which guarantees a
competitive ratio of 1
4
for the prophet problem. Recall that our motivation for the rehearsal algorithm was purely algorithmic:
we want to obtain a single-sample prophet inequality whose competitive ratio of 1 − O( 1√
k
) is asymptotically optimal in k.
While this motivation still holds from an algorithmic point of view, its not very strong in a mechanism design setting since our
use of reserves reduces the competitive ratio by a factor of at least 1
2
.
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F The Free-Order Model
In this section, we provide an improved and simplified analysis of the secretary algorithm in the free-order
model proposed by Jaillet, Soto, and Zenklusen [17]. It is easy to see that their algorithm satisfies a modified
definition of “order-oblivious” from Section 3 appropriate for the free-order model (the algorithm can choose
the order of P instead of having them come in adversarial order), meaning that their algorithm implies a
single-sample prophet inequality for the free-order model as well. Let’s first recall their algorithm:
1. Initialize the set of accepted elements, A, to ∅.
2. Sample k = Binomial(n, 1/2) elements uniformly at random from U and call these the sample set, S.
Call the remaining elements P .
3. Find the max-weight basis of S under J . Label these elements in decreasing order of weight, X1, . . . , Xk.
4. Set i = 1.
5. Draw one at a time in any order each element y ∈ P ∩ (span({X1, . . . , Xi})− span({X1, . . . , Xi−1})).
Add y to A iff A ∪ {y} ∈ J and vy > vXi .
6. Increment i by one and return to step 5. If i = k, and there are any elements not spanned by
{X1, . . . , Xm}, process them as in step 5.
We first recall a lemma from [17]:
Lemma 5. ([17]) If y is in the max-weight basis of U under J , and y ∈ P , then we will always have vy > vXi
when it is processed in step 5. The only way the algorithm will not accept y is if A already spans y.
Proof. By definition, we know that y ∈ span({X1, . . . , Xi}), and vX1 > . . . > vXi . So if vy < vXi , greedy
would not select y, and y cannot possibly be in the max-weight basis of U under J .
Definition 3. Let Z1, . . . , Zm′ list elements of S in decreasing order of weight for any S ⊆ U . Let i(y) be
the minimum i such that y ∈ span({Z1, . . . , Zi}) (if one exists). Then we say the cost of y with respect to S
is v(Zi(y)) (or 0 if no i(y) exists). Denote this by C(y, S).
Lemma 6. For all y ∈ U , if y ∈ P and C(y, S) > C(y, P − {y}), A will not span y when it is processed by
the algorithm in step 5.
Proof. First, we observe by the definition of the algorithm that when y is processed, the only elements that
could possibly be added to A are of weight at least vXi . So if y is already spanned, it must be spanned by a
subset of P −{y} whose elements all have weight at least vXi . However, it is obvious that C(y, S) = vXi . It
is also obvious that if y is spanned by a subset of P − {y} whose elements all have weight at least vXi , that
C(y, P − {y}) is at least vXi . Therefore, if A spans y at the time the algorithm processes y, it must be the
case that C(y, P − {y}) > C(y, S), proving the lemma.
Theorem 9. The algorithm of [17] obtains a competitve ratio of 14 whenever J is a matroid.
Proof. Clearly, for all y, y ∈ P with probability 1/2. Conditioned on this, it is also clear that C(y, S) >
C(y, P − {y}) with probability 1/2. This is because whenever we sample P − {y} and S, they are switched
with probability 1/2 and the costs are flipped as well. By Lemma 5 and 6, every element in the max-weight
basis of U under J , y, is accepted whenever y ∈ P and C(y, S) > C(y, P − {y}). As this happens with
probability 1/4, every element of the max-weight basis is accepted with probability 1/4, so the algorithm
obtains a competitive ratio of 1/4.
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G Analysis of the Rehearsal Algorithm
In this appendix we prove Theorem 2
Theorem (Theorem 2). Let I = (U ,J ) be a k-uniform matroid. The rehearsal algorithm is a single-sample
algorithm for the prophet problem with a competitive ratio of 1−O( 1√
k
).
G.1 Part I: The worst adversarial ordering and defining the random walk RW
Here, we provide the first step in analyzing the rehearsal algorithm, reducing the analysis to answering a
question about correlated random walks. We first state a convenient property of the rehearsal algorithm.
(In fact, it holds no matter how the thresholds T1, . . . , Tk are set.)
Lemma 7. For any vector of values v = (v1, v2, ..., vn), and any thresholds T1, . . . , Tk, the worst-case order
for the rehearsal algorithm is when the values vi are revealed in increasing order.
Proof. Consider any fixed v1, . . . , vn and T1, . . . , Tn and assume w.l.o.g. that v1 < . . . < vn. Also, say there
exists some j, j′ such that vj is revealed right before vj′ and vj > v′j . Clearly, such j, j
′ exist whenever the
values are not revealed in increasing order. We now want to consider the behavior of the rehearsal algorithm
if we swap the order in which vj and vj′ are revealed.
First, observe that whether vi is accepted or not depends only on what slots are available when vi is
revealed and not on what elements already filled the slots that are not available. So let S denote the set of
available slots right before vj is revealed. Let Sj denote the subset of S of slots whose threshold is below vj ,
and Sj′ the subset whose threshold is below vj′ . Since vj′ < vj , we have that Sj′ ⊆ Sj . Now we consider a
few cases:
First, maybe Sj = ∅. Then no matter what order vj and vj′ are revealed in, the rehearsal algorithm will
reject them both and the same set of thresholds will be available to the remaining elements. So the set of
accepted elements will be exactly the same regardless of the order of vj and vj′ .
Second, maybe Sj′ = ∅, Sj 6= ∅. Then no matter what order vj and vj′ are revealed in, the rehearsal
algorithm will reject vj′ and accept vj to fill the lowest available slot in Sj . So the same set of thresholds will
be available to the remaining elements and the set of accepted elements will be exactly the same regardless
of the order of vj and vj′ .
Third, maybe Sj = Sj′ and |Sj | ≥ 2. Then no matter what order vj and vj′ are revealed, the rehearsal
algorithm will accept both vj and vj′ and fill the two lowest slots of Sj . So the same set of thresholds will
be available to the remaining elements and the set of accepted elements will be exactly the same regardless
of the order of vj and vj′ .
Fourth, maybe |Sj | > |Sj′ | > 0. Then no matter what order vj and vj′ are revealed, vj will fill the slot of
Sj with the highest threshold value (which is necessarily not in Sj′), and vj′ will fill the slot in Sj′ with the
highest threshold value. So the same slots will be available to the remaining elements and set of accepted
elements will be exactly the same regardless of the order of vj and vj′ .
Finally, maybe Sj = Sj′ and |Sj | = 1. Then whichever of vj and vj′ is revealed first will fill the single
available slot. The second will be rejected. However, the same slots will be available to the remaining
elements regardless of their order, so the exact same set of remaining elements will be accepted. The only
difference is whether vj or vj′ was accepted. This is the only case where the set of accepted elements will
differ, and it differs exactly by replacing vj with vj′ , which strictly increases the value of accepted elements.
So we can start from any ordering of the vi’s and swapping elements a finite number of times until the vi’s
are sorted so that the values are revealed in increasing order. By the above argument, we did not improve
the value of accepted elements at any swapping step. Therefore, revealing the vi’s in order of increasing
values is indeed the worst-case order for the rehearsal algorithm.
Using Lemma 7, we may assume w.l.o.g. that all elements are revealed so that the values are in increasing
order. Using this, we will now reduce the problem of analyzing the rehearsal algorithm to answering a
question about correlated random walks. When we run the rehearsal algorithm, the following experiment
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happens. First, a sample vector s = (s1, ..., sn) is drawn from D and thresholds T1, . . . , Tk are set. Then,
values v1, ..., vn are revealed in increasing order and accepted/rejected according to the algorithm. Instead,
imagine the following equivalent experiment. First, two samples are taken from each Di, yi and y′i. Then,
independently for all i, we permute the pair (yi, y
′
i) to determine which element is a “sample” and which one
is a “value.” That is, we set vi = yi and si = y
′
i with probability
1
2 , or vi = y
′
i and si = yi with probability
1
2 . We will show that, for any y1, y
′
1, ..., yn, y
′
n, the rehearsal algorithm obtains good reward in expectation,
where the expectation is taken over the coin tosses that determine which of (yi, y
′
i) is a “value” and which
one is a “sample.”
Fix the list y1, y
′
1..., yn, y
′
n and let Yj denote the j
th highest value of this list. Let pj denote the probability,
over the randomness of the coin flips, that the prophet selects Yj (i.e. the probability that Yj is one of the
k largest “values”). Let’s observe a simple upper bound on the expected value the prophet attains with
samples Y1, . . . , Y2n:
Observation 1.
∑2n
j=1 pj · Yj ≤
∑2k
j=1
1
2 · Yj.
Proof. The prophet chooses element Yj with probability pj . Thus OPT =
∑2n
j=1 pjYj . Since the prophet
cannot select more than k items, we must have
∑2n
j=1 pj ≤ k. Furthermore, each Yj has a 12 chance of being
a “sample” and thus the prophet will never choose it. Thus pj ≤ 12 for all j. Since Y1 ≥ ... ≥ Y2n, these
constraints imply that
∑2n
j=1 pjYj ≤
∑2k
j=1
1
2Yj .
Our goal is to show that the gambler can guarantee a reward of (1−O( 1√
k
)) ·OPT by using the rehearsal
algorithm. Let qj denote the probability that the rehearsal algorithm selects Yj . By Observation 1, it
suffices to show that
∑2k
j=1 qjYj ≥ c2
∑2k
j=1 Yj for c = 1 − O( 1√k ). In fact, a sufficient condition for this is
that
∑i
j=1 qj ≥ ci/2 for all i ≤ 2k.17
The rest of this section is spent proving this claim. We do this by defining a random walk RW associated
with the performance of the rehearsal algorithm. The random walk starts at 0 and goes up or down depending
on whether Yj is a “sample” or a “value”. More formally, RW ’s definition is as follows:
Random Walk RW
1 Define RW (0) = 0.
2 For j > 0, given the value RW (j − 1) of the random walk at time j − 1, define the value
RW (j) of the random walk at time j as:
2.a RW (j) = RW (j − 1)− 1 if Yj is a “value”.
2.b RW (j) = RW (j−1)+1 if Yj is a “sample,” and there are at most k−2
√
k−2 different
i < j that are also “samples.”
2.c RW (j) = RW (j − 1) + 2√k+ 1 if Yj is a “sample,” and there are exactly k− 2
√
k− 1
different i < j that are also “samples.”
2.d RW (j) = RW (j − 1) if Yj is a “sample,” and there are at least k− 2
√
k different i < j
that are also “samples.”
To clarify, if Yj is a “value,” the walk moves down by 1 at step j. If Yj is a “sample” and would have set
a threshold, the walk moves up by 1 at step j. If Yj is a “sample” and would have set the threshold that is
repeated 2
√
k + 1 times, then the walk moves up by 2
√
k + 1 at step j. If Yj is a “sample” and would not
have set a threshold, the walk does not move at step j. Now we state some facts that relate the performance
of the rehearsal algorithm to facts about this random walk. Still assuming that all xi are revealed so that
the values are in increasing order, we show how to figure out, just by looking at this random walk, which
elements are selected by the rehearsal algorithm. We first need a definition and some facts. Figure G.1
illustrates these facts, assigning different colors to accepted and rejected values, as well as filled and unfilled
thresholds.
17It is easy to see that minimizing
∑
j qjYj subject to this condition will set qj = c/2 for all j ≤ 2k.
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Monday, November 5, 12
Figure 1: An illustration of our random walk. The steps in blue correspond to selected values (since the
random walk returns to these values eventually), the values in red correspond to rejected values. The samples
in black are unfilled thresholds, the samples in green are filled thresholds. The samples in yellow are samples
that do not determine a threshold. Notice that there’s a threshold that produces a large jump in the random
walk. We also highlight a point i, together with its corresponding left and right heights. The value is
accepted because its right height is greater than zero. The number of values to the left that are not accepted
is exactly HLi −HRi .
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Definition 4. For any j, HRj (RW ) is the height of RW to the right of j. Or formally, H
R
j (RW ) =
maxi≥j{RW (i)−RW (j)}. Similarly, HLj (RW ) is the height of RW to the left of j. Formally, HLj (RW ) =
maxi≤j{RW (i)−RW (j)}.
If it is clear from context, we will just write HLj instead of H
L
j (RW ). We can now prove two facts about
this random walk and its relation to the rehearsal algorithm when values are revealed by the adversary in
increasing order.
Fact 1. Assuming that the vi are revealed so that the values are in increasing order, for all j, Yj is chosen
by the rehearsal algorithm if and only if Yj is a “value” and H
R
j > 0.
Proof. If HRj > 0, then there is some i > j with RW (i) > RW (j). RW increases every time it sees a
threshold, and decreases every time it sees a value. So that means that there are more thresholds than
“values” in the list (Yj+1, ..., Yi). This necessarily means that the first “value” revealed that is at least Yj
will be selected, because there will be at least one available threshold between Yi and Yj . Because we are
assuming that the values are revealed in increasing order, Yj is exactly the first value revealed that is at
least Yj , and is therefore selected.
If RW (i) ≤ RW (j), then there are at least as many “values” as there are thresholds in the list
(Yj+1, ..., Yi). Because the values are revealed in increasing order, this means that the slot using thresh-
old Yi will certainly be filled before Yj is revealed. If H
R
j = 0, then it is true that RW (i) ≤ RW (j) for all
i > j, which means that all possible slots that Yj could use will be filled before Yj is revealed, and therefore
Yj will not be selected by the rehearsal algorithm.
Fact 2. For all i, the number of “values” in {Y1, ..., Yi} that are not selected by the rehearsal algorithm is
max{HLi −HRi , 0}.
Proof. Let j1, . . . , jh denote the indices of the “values” in (Y1, ..., Yi) that are not selected by the rehearsal
algorithm in increasing order. We show that HLi −HRi = h by first showing that HLi −HRi ≥ h, and then
showing that HLi −HRi ≤ h.
For any index k in {1, ..., h}, Yjk is not selected. Thus, Fact 1 tells us that it must be the case that
RW (z) ≤ RW (jk) for all z ≥ jk. In particular, this must hold for z = jk+1 − 1. Because Yjk+1 is a
“value”, we know that RW (jk+1) = RW (jk+1 − 1) − 1, and therefore RW (jk+1) ≤ RW (jk) − 1. Chaining
this together for all k in {1, ..., h}, we get that RW (jh) ≤ RW (j1) − (h − 1). Because j1 is a “value”,
RW (j1) = RW (j1 − 1)− 1, which means that we get RW (jh) ≤ RW (j1 − 1)− h.
Since jh is the index of a “value” that was not selected by the rehearsal algorithm, we know from
fact 1 that RW (z) ≤ RW (jh) for all indices z ≥ jh (which includes all z ≥ i, since jh ∈ {1, ..., i}).
Let m = RW (jh) − RW (i) and note that HLi ≥ RW (j1) − RW (i) ≥ h + RW (jh) − RW (i) = h + m.
Furthermore, since RW (z) ≤ RW (jh) for all z ≥ i, we have HRi ≤ RW (jh) − RW (i) = m. We conclude
that HLi −HRi ≥ h+m−m = h.
Let H = HLi −HRi . We will show that H ≤ h, thus concluding the proof. Since HLi = HRi + H, there
exists an index j ∈ {1, ..., i} such that RW (j) = RW (i) +HRi +H. So, for every k in {1, ...,H}, choose jk
to be the largest index in {1, ..., i} such that RW (jk − 1) ≥ RW (i) + HRi + k. By this definition, we have
RW (jk) < RW (i) + H
R
i + k ≤ RW (jk − 1), and thus the random walk goes down at step jk. This means
that Yjk is a “value”. Furthermore, the value Yjk is not selected by the rehearsal algorithm because H
R
jk
= 0.
To see this, note that for any index j between jk and i, we have RW (j) ≤ RW (jk) by the definition of jk
(otherwise jk would not be the largest index satisfying RW (jk − 1) ≥ RW (i) +HRi + k). Furthermore, for
every index j ≥ i, we have RW (j) ≤ RW (i) +HRi < RW (i) +HRi + k ≤ RW (jk − 1) = RW (jk) + 1. Thus,
we have RW (j) ≤ RW (jk) for every j > jk. By Fact 1 this implies that Yjk is a value that does not get
selected by the rehearsal algorithm. We showed in this paragraph that there are at least H = HLi −HRi such
values. In the previous paragraph we show that there are at most H such values. Thus, we conclude that
the number of values in {1, ..., i} that are not selected by the rehearsal algorithm is exactly HLi −HRi .
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The expected number of “values” in {Y1, ..., Yi} is i2 . By Fact 2, we have that the expected number of
values in {Y1, ..., Yi} selected by the rehearsal algorithm is i2 −E[max{HLi −HRi , 0}], where the expectation
is taken with respect to the coin tosses of the random walk. Thus, to show that
∑i
j=1 qj ≥ ci2 for c = 1− d√k
(where we have made explicit the constant d in O( 1√
k
)), it suffices to show that
E[max{HLi −HRi , 0}] ≤
d · i
2
√
k
.
Our next subsection is dedicated to proving this inequality.
G.2 Rehearsal Algorithm Analysis Part II: Bounding the height of the random
walk
In light of the previous section, we have reduced the analysis of the rehearsal algorithm to proving the
following theorem.
Theorem 10. E[max{HLi −HRi , 0}] ≤ O( i√k )∀i ≤ 2k, where the constant implicit in the O(·) notation is
the same for all i.
Recall that our random walk is non-traditional in two ways. First, after k−√2k positive steps, the random
walk jumps an additional 2
√
k + 1 units. Second, the steps of the random walk are slightly correlated. In
each pair yi, y
′
i ← Di, exactly one induces a non-negative step (by being a “sample”) and the other one must
induce a negative step (by being a “value”). Thus, the steps in the random walk are correlated. Our proof
of theorem 10 accounts for these obstacles using the following steps.
1. We show that for large i we in fact have E[HLi ] ≤ O(i/
√
k). It is clear that E[HLi ] ≥ E[max{HLi −
HRi , 0}], so this is enough. We prove this by first observing that if there were no correlation between
steps and no jump, then this is a well-known fact about the expected height of random walks. Then
we show that the jump and correlation can only decrease E[HLi ].
2. The analysis is made difficult by the fact that RW jumps up at a random location. To circumvent this
difficulty, we will describe a new random walk RW ′ that jumps up at a fixed index instead of after the
(k−2√k)th threshold seen. For all small i, it will be clear that HLi (RW ) = HLi (RW ′), and we will show
that HRi (RW
′) ≤ HRi (RW ) with very high probability. (The probability that HRi (RW ′) > HRi (RW )
is inversely exponential in k.) As HRi (RW ) is clearly at most k, this means that for small i, we only
have to bound E[max{HLi (RW ′)−HRi (RW ′), 0}], which is still challenging but much cleaner.
3. We show in RW ′ that for small i and j < i, HRj = 0 with low probability. We first prove that this
is true if there was no correlation, and show that correlation can only decrease the probability that
HRj = 0. By Facts 1 and 2, this exactly says that E[max{HLi −HRi , 0}] is small.
We now proceed to show step 1, that for all i ≥ k/2, E[HLi ] ≤ O(i/
√
k). First, it is clear that the jump
cannot possibly increase E[HLi ], because for all j < i, either the jump does not affect RW (j) − RW (i), or
it decreases RW (j) − RW (i) by 2√k + 1. So we may ignore the jump as doing so only increases E[HLi ].
Next, it is clear that if there is no correlation between steps to the left of i, then HLi is just the height of a
truly random walk starting at i going back to 0. It is a well-known consequence of the reflection principle
that the expected height of a random walk on i steps is O(
√
i), see e.g. [13]. Because i ≥ k/2, this would
exactly say that E[HLi ] ≤ O(i/
√
k). Now we just have to show that the same bound holds even if there
are correlated pairs before i. To do this, we show that for any pair of correlated steps, decorrelating them
only increases E[HLi ], regardless of any other correlation. We can then apply this argument a finite number
of times, decorrelating every pair of correlated steps to increase E[HLi ] to a value that is O(i/
√
k) by our
previous observation. Therefore, it must be the case that E[HLi ] ≤ O(i/
√
k).
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Lemma 8. Let RW be any random walk of n steps where steps x and y are negatively correlated random
variables, each uniformly distributed in {±1}. Consider modifying RW by replacing steps x, y with i.i.d.
uniform samples from {±1} that are independent of the other steps in RW . This modification cannot
decrease the expected height of RW , even if there are other correlated steps in RW .
Proof. Imagine that the random walk is fixed except for what happens at x and y. Then this random walk
has a height. And we can consider how the height is expected to change by filling in what happens at x
and y if they are correlated and decorrelated respectively. We just need to show that the expected change
is greater when x and y are decorrelated.
Imagine in this fixed random walk that we have removed the step at x and at y. Or in other words, the
random walk stays level at these steps. Then let a denote the height of the peak before x, b the height of
the peak between x and y, and c the height of the peak after y. If there are no steps in the walk in any
of these positions, then the value of the appropriate variable is −∞. We then consider adding in steps at
x and y (i.e. changing the fixed walk from staying level at these two points to taking a genuine step). We
consider what happens when the two steps are correlated and uncorrelated, showing that no matter what
relations are satisfied by a, b, c that if x and y are uncorrelated, the expected height is always greater. There
are several different cases to consider, but they are all simple.
Case 1: a = b = c. If x and y are correlated, we change b to b−1 and b+1 each with probability 1/2, and
don’t change c. So with probability 1/2 we increase the height by 1, with probability 1/2 it is unchanged. If
x and y are uncorrelated, with probability 1/4 we increase c by 2 and b by 1. With probability 1/4 we leave
c unchanged and increase b by 1. With probability 1/4 we decrease b by 1 and leave c unchanged, and with
probability 1/4 we decrease b by 1 and c by 2. So with probability 1/4 we increase the height by 1, with
probability 1/4 we increase it by 2, and with probability 1/2 we leave it unchanged.
Case 2: a ≤ b < c. If x and y are correlated, they cannot change the height ever. If x and y are
uncorrelated, we increase the height by 2 with probability 1/4 and decrease the height by 2 (or 1 if c = b+1)
with probability 1/4.
Case 3: b ≤ a < c. Same as above.
Case 4: a > b, a > c. If x and y are correlated, we do not change the height ever. If x and y are
uncorrelated, we never decrease the height, and sometimes may increase the height if a = c+ 1.
Case 5: b > a, b > c. Whether or not x and y are correlated, we increase the height by 1 with probability
1/2 and decrease it by 1 with probability 1/2.
Case 6: a = b > c. Whether or not x and y are correlated, we increase the height by 1 with probability
1/2 and never decrease it.
Case 7: a = c > b. If x and y are correlated, we never change the height. If x and y are uncorrelated, we
sometimes increase height by 2, and sometimes don’t change it.
Case 8: b = c > a. If x and y are correlated, we never decrease c and increase b by 1 with probability
1/2. So the expected increase is 1/2. When x and y are uncorrelated, we increase c by 2 with probability
1/4, increase b by 1 without changing c with probability 1/4, and decrease b by 1 without changing c
with probability 1/4, and decreases b by 1 and c by 2 with probability 1/4. So the expected increase is
1/2 + 1/4− 1/4 = 1/2.
In all cases, it is easy to see that the expected increase in height when x and y are uncorrelated is at least
as large as the expected increase in height when x and y are correlated. This covers all cases and does not
depend on any other existing correlations in RW . Therefore, decorrelating steps x and y can only increase
the expected height of RW .
Using Lemma 8 and the reasoning above, we complete step 1 of the proof with the following corollary:
Corollary 4. ∀i ≥ k/2, E[HLi ] ≤ O(i/
√
k).
We complete step 2 of the proof. First, define the following random walk RW ′
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Random Walk RW’
1 Define RW ′(0) = 0.
2 For j > 0, given the value RW ′(j − 1) of the random walk at time j − 1, define the value
RW ′(j) of the random walk at time j as:
• RW ′(j) = RW ′(j − 1)− 1 if Yj is a “value” and 1 ≤ j < 2k − 4
√
k + 2k2/3.
• RW ′(j) = RW ′(j − 1) + 1 if Yj is a “sample” and 1 ≤ j < 2k − 4
√
k + 2k2/3.
• RW ′(j) = RW ′(j − 1) +√k when j = 2k − 4√k + 2k2/3.
• RW ′(j) = RW ′(j − 1) for j > 2k − 4√k + 2k2/3.
We can prove the following lemma about RW ′.
Lemma 9. HRi (RW
′) ≤ HRi (RW ) for all i ≤ k/2 with probability 1− e−Ω(k).
Proof. Let i∗ denote the index where RW shoots up by 2
√
k + 1. We first show that with high probability
both of the following events hold:
1. 2k − 4√k − 2k2/3 ≤ i∗ ≤ 2k − 4√k + 2k2/3.
2. For all i, j ∈ [2k − 4√k − 2k2/3, 2− 4√k + 2k2/3], RW ′(i)−RW ′(j) ≤ √k.
Part 1 is a simple application of the Chernoff bound. If we are to have i∗ < T = 2k−4√k−2k2/3, then we
must have seen k−2√k rehearsal elements by then. If we let k′ denote the number of indices before T whose
correlated partner also comes before before T , then clearly there will be exactly k′/2 rehearsal elements
from such indices. For the remaining indices, whether that element is rehearsed or real is independent of
all other indices before T . The expected number of rehearsal elements from the remaining indices is exactly
(T − k′)/2. So in order to see at least k − 2√k, this value must deviate from it’s expectation by at least
k2/3. Using the additive Chernoff bound we get that:
Pr[more than k − 2
√
k rehearsals before T ]
≤ 2e−k4/3/(2T−2k′) ≤ 2e−k1/3/4
An analagous argument holds to show that i∗ < 2k− 4√k+ 2k2/3 with high probability by showing that
the probability that we see fewer than k − 2√k rehearsals by then is equally tiny. Therefore, using a union
bound, part 1 holds with probability at least 1− 4e−k1/3/4.
Part 2 is also an application of the Chernoff bound. For any fixed i, j, the expected value of RW ′(i) −
RW ′(j) is 0. There are some steps between i and j that are correlated, and will always cancel each other
out. The remaining steps are all independent and there are at most 4k2/3 of them. So RW ′(i) − RW ′(j)
must deviate from its expecation by at least
√
k and we can apply the Chernoff bound again to say that:
Pr[|RW ′(i)−RW ′(j)| ≥
√
k] ≤ 2e−k1/3/8
We can now take a union bound over all O(k4/3) ordered pairs of i, j to get that with probability at least
1− 8k4/3e−k1/3/8, RW ′(i)−RW ′(j) ≤ √k for all i, j. So taking a final union bound gives us that with high
probability parts 1 and 2 both hold.
Now let’s couple RW and RW ′ to use the same coin flips. In other words, when Yj is determined to be real
or rehearsal, it is the same for both walks. Also assume that parts 1 and 2 hold for RW and RW ′ respectively.
We now show that as long as these two assumptions hold, then for any i ≤ k/2, HRi (RW ′) ≤ HRi (RW ).
Because i ≤ k/2, it must be the case that i < i∗, so RW (i) = RW ′(i). Let j ≥ i be the index
maximizing RW ′(j)−RW ′(i). Then HRi (RW ′) = RW ′(j)−RW ′(i). There are two cases to consider. Say
j < i∗. Then RW ′(j) = RW (j), and therefore RW (j) − RW (i) = RW ′(j) − RW ′(i), so we immediately
get that HRi (RW ) ≥ HRi (RW ′). Otherwise, i∗ ≤ j ≤ 2k − 4
√
k + 2k2/3. Then RW ′(j)− RW ′(i) ≤ 2√k +
RW ′(i∗)−RW (i) by our two assumptions. By the definition of RW , we also have that RW (i∗)−RW (i) =
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RW ′(i∗)+2
√
k−RW (i), so this exactly says that RW ′(j)−RW ′(i) ≤ RW (i∗)−RW (i), also giving us that
HRi (RW ) ≥ HRi (RW ′). It cannot be the case that j > 2k − 4
√
k + 2k2/3 because we defined RW ′ to stop
changing after this. So this covers every possible case, and in all cases HRi (RW ) ≥ HRi (RW ′). Because our
assumptions hold with high probability, so does the result.
We now finish by showing that for all j ≤ k/2, HRj (RW ′) = 0 with probability O(1/
√
k). We prove this
claim in two steps. First, we show that if RW ′ had no correlated steps, then HRj (RW
′) = 0 with probability
O(1/
√
k) for all j. Then we show that removing a specific correlated pair only increases the probability that
HRj (RW
′) = 0, regardless of any other correlation in RW ′. We can apply this argument a finite number
of times to remove all correlated pairs without decreasing the probability that HRj (RW
′) = 0. Therefore,
because this probability is now O(1/
√
k), it must be the case that Pr[HRj (RW
′) = 0] ≤ O(1/√k) to begin
with.
We now take the first step. Let RW ′′ denote RW ′ without the
√
k jump at the end. Then in order for
HRi (RW
′) = 0, we must have RW ′′(j) ≤ RW ′′(i) for all j ≥ i and RW ′′(2k−4√k+ 2k2/3) ≤ RW ′′(i)−√k.
We show that if RW ′′ has no correlated steps, then both of these occur with low probability.
Lemma 10. Let RW ′′ be a random walk with n truly independent steps. Then for all n, the probability that
H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k is O(1/√k).
Proof. We first compute the probability that H(RW ′′) > 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k using the reflection
principle. For any fixed walk with H(RW ′′) > 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k, let i be the last index with RW ′′(i) =
1. Consider the mapping that sets RW ′′(j) = 2−RW ′′(j) for all j > i. This mapping is clearly injective and
always has RW ′′(n) ≥ √k+2. In fact, the same mapping takes any fixed random walk with RW ′′(n) ≥ √k+2
and turns it into a random walk with H(RW ′′) > 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k, thereby creating a bijection. In
other words, this mapping bears evidence that Pr[H(RW ′′) > 0∧RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k] = Pr[RW ′′(n) > 2+√k].
Furthermore, we can write Pr[H(RW ′′) = 0∧RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k] = Pr[RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k]−Pr[H(RW ′′) >
0 ∧ RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k], which by the above work is exactly Pr[RW ′′(n) ≥ √k] − Pr[RW ′′(n) ≥ 2 +√k] =
Pr[RW ′′(n) ∈ {√k,√k + 1}] ≈ ( nn/2+√k/2)/2n. So now we just want to bound this value.
We observe first that for all n that:( n+2
n/2+1+
√
k/2
)
2n+2
=
(
n
n/2+
√
k/2
)
2n
× (n+ 2)(n+ 1)
4(n/2−√k/2 + 1)(n/2 +√k/2 + 1)
=
(
n
n/2+
√
k/2
)
2n
× n
2 + 3n+ 2
n2 + 4n+ 4− k
In other words, for n < k − 2, the value increases when we increase n by 2. For n > k − 2, the value
decreases when we increase n by 2. Therefore, the value is maximized around n = k, where it is obvious that(
k
k/2+
√
k/2
)
/2k ≤ O(1/√k). Therefore, for all n, the probability that H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −√k is
O(1/
√
k).
Finally, we prove that removing the correlated pairs in RW ′ only increases the probability that HRi = 0:
Lemma 11. Let RW ′′ be a random walk on n steps where some pairs of steps (x1, y1), . . . , (xz, yz) are
negatively correlated. Let xi < yi for all i and y1 < . . . < yz. Then removing x1, y1 from RW
′′ only
increases the probability that H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m, for all n,m.
Proof. Observe first that we are not claiming that removing any correlated pair can only increase this
probability, but that there is always a “correct” pair that we can remove without decreasing the probability.
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For a fixed random walk, imagine removing steps x1 and y1 (i.e. don’t move at these steps). Then let a
denote the height of the highest peak before x1, b denote the height of the highest peak between x1 and y1, c
denote the height of the highest peak after y1, and d the value of RW
′′(n). Also let S(a, b, c, d) denote the set
of all instances of RW ′′ that respect the correlation between the pairs of steps (x2, y2) through (xz, yz) with
respective peak heights a, b, c and also satisfy RW ′′(n) = d. Then every instance of RW ′′ is in exactly one
set, and whether or not H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m depends only on which S(a, b, c, d) the instance is
in. We now want to look at which sets will satisfy this regardless of how steps x1 and y1 are set, and which
sets may or may not satisfy it depending on how x1 and y1 are set.
We observe that setting x1 and y1 can never change a, c, or d, but may increase or decrease b by 1.
So if a > 0, b > 1, c > 0, or d > −m, then we will never have H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m no
matter how x1, y1 are set. Likewise, if we have a ≤ 0, b < 0, c ≤ 0, and d ≤ −m, then we will always
have H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m no matter how x1, y1 are set. The interesting cases are when we
have a ≤ 0, c ≤ 0, d ≤ −m and b ∈ {0, 1}. If we remove x1 and y1, then all of these cases with b = 1 will
not have H(RW ′′) = 0, and those with b = 0 will. If we keep x1 and y1, then exactly half of both cases
will have H(RW ′′) = 0. We show that there are more of the latter case than the former. In other words,
if we removed x1 and y1, instead of splitting these cases 50-50, more of them would yield H(RW
′′) = 0
and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m. Therefore removing x1 and y1 only increases the probability that H(RW ′′) = 0 and
RW ′′(n) ≤ −m. We prove this by giving an injective map from the former case to the latter.
Consider any instance of RW ′′ in S(a, 1, c, d) with a ≤ 0. Let i denote the first index after x1 with
RW ′′(i) = 1. Then it must be the case (because a ≤ 0) that RW ′′(i − 1) = 0. So consider changing RW ′′
to take a step down at i instead of up (i.e. set RW ′′(i) = −1). If i was part of a correlated pair, then also
change RW ′′ to take a step up at its partner, j. It is clear that we have not changed a. We might have
decreased c by 2, 1, or 0, depending on if i was part of a correlated pair and where its partner was located,
and we might have decreased d by 2 or 0, depending on if i was part of a correlated pair. Furthermore, this
map is injective. Observe first that we can determine the index i of the instance of RW ′′ where the flip
happened by looking at its image under the map. A priori, i could be any index between x1 and y1 with
RW ′′(i− 1) = 0 and RW ′′(i) = −1. But in fact, i must necessarily be the last of such indices. Assume for
contradiction that there were some i < i′ < y1 with RW ′′(i′− 1) = 0 and RW ′′(i′) = −1 in the image. Then
the pre-image would have taken a step up at i instead of down, and we would have had RW ′′(i′ − 1) = 2 in
the pre-image, meaning that the instance was not in S(a, 1, c, d). Even if i was part of a correlated step, by
our choice of x1, y1, its partner necessarily occurs after y1, and therefore will not cancel out the change from
switching RW ′′(i) by the time we take step i′ − 1. Since we can determine the index i from the image, and
it is obvious that if two instances of RW ′′ have the same image and had the same step switched they must
be the same, this map is injective. Finally, the map only decreases c and d. So in particular, if:
S1 = ∪a≤0,c≤0,d≤−mS(a, 1, c, d)
S0 = ∪a≤0,c≤0,d≤−mS(a, 0, c, d)
then we have shown an injective map from S1 to S0. Also denote by S2 all other instances of RW
′′ with
H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m, and S3 the remaining instances of RW ′′. Then the probability that
H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m when we have removed x1 and y1 is exactly:
|S0|+ |S2|
|S0|+ |S1|+ |S2|+ |S3|
And the probability that H(RW ′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m when we keep x1 and y1 is exactly:
|S0|/2 + |S1|/2 + |S2|
|S0|+ |S1|+ |S2|+ |S3|
By showing an injective map from S1 to S0, we have shown that the first probability is greater. Namely,
removing x1 and y1 can only increase the probability that H(RW
′′) = 0 and RW ′′(n) ≤ −m.
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Now by Lemma 11, we can continue removing the earliest-ending correlated pair from RW ′ until we get
a random walk with truly independent steps (and
√
k jump at the end) whose probability of probability of
having H(RW ′) ≥ 0 has only increased. By Lemma 10, we know that this value is O(1/√k). So together,
this says that Pr[HRj (RW
′) = 0] ≤ O(1/√k) for all j ≤ k/2. Finally, by Lemma 9 and the fact that
HRi (RW ) ≤ k always, we get that Pr[HRj (RW ) = 0] ≤ O(1/
√
k). This exactly says that the expected
number of of j ≤ i with HRj (RW ) = 0 is O(i/
√
k) for all i ≤ k/2. By Facts 1 and 2 we now have that
E[max{HLi (RW )−HRi (RW ), 0}] ≤ O(i/
√
k).
So now we have shown that for all i ≤ 2k, E[max{HLi (RW )−HRi (RW ), 0}] ≤ O(i/
√
k), completing the
proof of Theorem 10, and proving that the rehearsal algorithm obtains a competitive ratio of 1−O(1/√k).
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